

Risk Adjustment

Can we balance pressures for payment, quality, and equity?

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
Outline

- Background on recurring challenges in the US health care system and the importance of risk adjustment
- Define risk adjustment
- Conceptual and measurement challenges
- The tension between payment, quality, and equity

Recurrent Themes over the past 30 years

- First is the financing of health care
- Physicians and hospitals want to get paid fairly
- Struggle to find payment methods that reward socially desirable outcomes
 - Capitation rewards providing too little care
 - Fee for service rewards providing too much care


FIGURE A.
U.S. Health-Care Expenditures as a Share of GDP, 1960–2018



Source: CMS 1960–2018.

Second Theme: Quality Gaps


- Large and persistent quality gaps
- An entire field of study, implementation science, has developed to reduce these gaps.



Equity

Figure 1

Number of Uninsured and Uninsured Rate among the Nonelderly Population, 2008-2019



NOTE: Includes nonelderly individuals ages 0 to 64.
SOURCE: KFF analysis of 2008-2019 American Community Survey, 1-Year Estimates.

KFF

- Insurance coverage is often used as a measure of equity
- Affordable Care Act decreased the number of those without insurance
- Growth of high deductible health plans
 - HDHP were associated with higher rates of harmfully delayed care: hernias → strangulated hernia.

Aligning Incentives

- Improving efficiency, quality and equity have proven to be persistently challenging.
- Well-known efforts
 - Prospective payment
 - Pay for performance
 - Accountable care organizations
 - Hospital readmission reduction program
 - Bundled payments



Why is alignment persistently difficult?

- Example: ICU Care



Aligning Incentives: ICU care

- Up to 50% of ICU admissions in the US are not for life sustaining care (don't belong in the ICU).
- Paradoxically, prior to COVID, many hospitals were expanding their number of ICU beds

Why are Hospitals Expanding ICUs?

Four reasons

- 1. Heterogenous patients:** ICUs treat different types of patients
 - Those who need life sustaining care
 - Dying patients
 - Lower acuity patients where the clinician wants extra monitoring of vitals
- 2. Imperfect information:** Hard to differentiate between heterogenous patients in administrative data.
- 3. Marginal benefits >0:** There can be benefits for treating low acuity patients in an ICU.¹
- 4. Higher reimbursement:** Fee for service payments are higher for an ICU than a medical surgical bed.

Resource Constraints

- This wouldn't be a problem with unlimited resources.
- Average annual health insurance contribution in 2020
 - Avg Individual plans: \$7,000
 - Avg Family plans: \$13,700.
- How do we create health care systems that maximize quality, efficiency, and equity?



"It helps cut post-op recovery times, as well as health-care costs."

Data Driven Policy

- Federal agencies, including CMS, AHRQ, and VA are increasingly using administrative data to shape policies and programs
- Even the FDA is facing these questions given increases in low-risk devices (wearables)
- Correlational data are subject to all sorts of confounding



Risk Adjustment

- Because we aren't randomizing patients to health plans and providers, if we want to compare patients, we need risk adjustment to control for variation in patient sickness / acuity
- Risk adjustment creates incentives
 - Selecting low risk cases (“cherry picking”)
 - Providing more more care over time
 - Upcoding¹
 - Selective contracting
- Increasing awareness of equity beyond health insurance (i.e., social determinants of health)

1. Geruso M, Layton T. Upcoding: Evidence from Medicare on Squishy Risk Adjustment. *Journal of Political Economy*. 2019 Jun 5;128(3):984–1026.

Programs that Use Risk Adjustment

- Medicare Advantage (MA)
- The Affordable Care Act (ACA) exchanges
- CMS alternative payment models
 - Bundled Care Payment Initiative
 - Merit Based Incentive Payment System
- Hospital Compare

<http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare>

Find & compare nursing homes, hospitals & other providers near you.

[Learn more about the types of providers listed here](#)

MY LOCATION

Street, ZIP code, city, or state

PROVIDER TYPE

Hospitals



NAME OF FACILITY (optional)

Facility name

Search

Or, select a provider type to learn more:



Doctors & clinicians



Hospitals



Nursing homes including
rehab services



Home health services

1. **Stanford Health Care** (4R)

1 mi

ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS

300 Pasteur Drive
Stanford, CA 94305
(650) 723-5708

Overall star rating



Patient survey rating



Compare



2. **Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Redwood City** (4R)

4.9 mi

ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS

1100 Veterans Boulevard
Redwood City, CA 94063
(650) 299-2000

Overall star rating



Patient survey rating



Compare



3. **Sequoia Hospital** (4R)

5.9 mi


ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS




170 Alameda DE Las Pulgas
Redwood City, CA 94062
(650) 369-5811

Overall star rating



Patient survey rating



	Stanford Health Care  (650) 723-5708	Kaiser Foundation Hospital -...  (650) 299-2000	Sequoia Hospital  (650) 369-5811
Central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) in ICUs and select wards ↓ Lower numbers are better National benchmark: 1.000	0.615 Better than the national benchmark	1.836 No different than national benchmark	2.203 No different than national benchmark
Catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTI) in ICUs and select wards ↓ Lower numbers are better National benchmark: 1.000	1.285 No different than national benchmark	0.913 No different than national benchmark	0.515 No different than national benchmark
Surgical site infections (SSI) from colon surgery ↓ Lower numbers are better National benchmark: 1.000	1.241 No different than national benchmark	0.618 No different than national benchmark	2.455 No different than national benchmark
Surgical site infections (SSI) from abdominal hysterectomy ↓ Lower numbers are better National benchmark: 1.000	1.356 No different than national benchmark	Not available ¹³	Not available ¹³

Almost impossible to find the methods behind these numbers, including risk adjustment

What is Risk Adjustment?

Risk Adjustment Goal

- Produce an estimate of central tendency that
 - Accurately reflects the average “risk” across different groups (healthy, sick).
 - Not easily gameable.
 - Is transparent.
- For costs or payments, averages are preferred over medians
 - This estimate should be influenced by the extremes, otherwise we create incentives for how we treat very sick (i.e., expensive) patients
- This risk score can then be used in statistical models to control for differential risk profiles across groups.

Risk Score Vs Co-morbidities

- Many studies control for specific illness using diagnostic groups with dummy variables
- Advantage of using actual risk score
 - The score means something (probability of death; expected cost)
 - Prior experience using the risk score (strengths and weaknesses)
 - Ease of use. Nosos is updated and available for patients on the VA CDW
 - Degrees of freedom (an issue for small studies)

Risk Scores Rely on Algorithms

- Most of my research focuses on risk adjustment for costs / payments.
- Many risk adjustment methods use regression models, to estimate the total costs.
- These risk adjustment models are often used for quality or outcome assessment.


Risk Focus

- Disease specific: computed for a specific group
 - Examples: STS Short-Term Risk Calculator calculates a patient's risk of mortality and morbidities for cardiac surgery.
- Generic: models that estimate risk for a population
 - Hierarchical condition categories (HCCs)
 - Charlson co-morbidity Index
 - Elixhauser co-morbidity Index
- Generic measures are most appropriate when addressing questions of value or payment.

Medicare and Medicaid

- CMS relies uses hierarchical condition categories (HCCs) for risk adjustment
 - HCCs were created for Medicare Advantage
 - Exchanges and alternative payment models now also use the HCCs
- HCC model (V21-V24)
 - V21. 2009-2015: ICD-9 codes.
 - V22/23. 2016-2019: Updated V21 to work with ICD-10 codes
 - V24. 2020 onwards. Many more HCCs especially in mental health
- The HCCs are based on diagnostic information

Hierarchical Categorization



Medicare Risk Score

- CMS uses a simple linear regression model to estimate the relative contribution of each HCC

$$\text{Cost} = \alpha + \sum HCCs + age + sex + age * sex + \varepsilon$$


- Calibration: Risk score = predicted cost from regression / average spending for Medicare ~\$9300
 - 1 = average risk, >1 is higher risk, <1 is lower risk
- CMS produces software that allows plans to enter diagnostic information and obtain a risk score

Timing

- Prospective risk. Using data from this year to estimate risk in the next year (Medicare Advantage uses this for payments).
- Concurrent risk. Using data this year to estimate fair payments or penalties for this year (MIPS, Bundled payments)

Prospective Risk

- Many people are familiar with prospective risk models.




CKD and Depression would not be included in the prospective risk score estimated at the time of surgery

Prospective Risk Models


- Prospective Risk is used in establishing payments for Medicare Advantage → pay health plans this year based on the patient's risk profile from the prior year
- But generic prospective risk scores are less commonly used in broad studies of payment, quality and equity
 - Partly a result of the “timing problem.”

Timing in Prospective Risk






Concurrent Risk

- Risk score is based on information from the entire year
- This method ignores the temporal sequencing. You could risk adjust the surgical intervention for care that happens after the surgery




- This has led some to conclude that concurrent risk is biased



These Models are Imperfect

But they Matter

- McGuire et al found imbalance in the extremes in the US, Germany and Netherlands
- In the United States exchanges, in 2017
 - one in 1,000 enrollees were underpaid by > \$190,000
 - one in 1,000 enrollees were overpaid > \$95,000



Rare events, but
being underpaid
is more likely than
being overpaid

Are You Risk Adverse?

- Physicians / insurers seek to manage risk
 - Risk pooling
 - Selective contracting
 - Accepting patients / transfers
- Physicians should care about risk adjustment
 - Poor risk adjustment increases each physician's gamble
 - Over reliance on diagnostic codes that do not discriminate at the extremes
 - Over reliance on simple statistical models that are transparent but less robust
 - Concerns about whether the risk score creates incentives for gaming

Model & Model Fit


- New statistical models and variables (e.g., pharmacy or functioning) make this is interesting area of study
- Multiple gauges of statistical success
 - Area under the curve (AUC)
 - R^2
 - MSAE
 - Calibration curves, Brier scores / Hosmer Lemeshow deciles (predictive accuracy)
- Often R^2 is reported, but these statistics provide different information under different circumstances.

The Allure of Measurement

*Measurement issues
often take center stage*



*Conceptual issues are often
downplayed.*



KUPER

“Actually, it’s all we ever talk about.”

Risk Adjustment for VA

- In 2015, VA was spending > \$200,000 a year for commercial risk adjustment software.
- We embarked on a study to determine whether we could create open-source software to save the VA money.
- We started the CMS HCC V21 model and ran analyses with 6 samples

Initially We Struggled to Match DxCG

	V21 Risk	DxCG
R^2		
General	0.5793	0.6274
Older	0.5728	0.6233
MH-SUD	0.5820	0.6268
High cost	0.3559	0.4244
Multimorbid	0.5350	0.5957
Low risk	0.2922	0.3508

We Succeeded with Three Changes

Pharmacy data

- CMS V21 did not include pharmacy information
- We created 25 groups based on drug class

Mental health

- CMS V21 had 4 mental health & substance use groups
- We created 62 groups (PsyCMS)

More sophisticated statistical models

- CMS V21 used linear regression
- We used square root transformed model to address extreme high costs

This risk model, known as Nosos, is now produced quarterly for all VA users.

Nosos

- The resulting risk score is Nosos-- Greek for chronic condition
- Computed annually and quarterly
 - Use the annual risk scores, if you have a choice
 - Quarterly scores based on spending projections
- We've updated it over time.
 - FY20, we switched to HCC V24
 - Also include Fee and PIT data
- Partnership between HERC and OPES. Updated technical documentation are on the HERC website.

Follow-up Studies

- Does the risk model fit improve when you add more clinical history?
 - Answer: Surprisingly no
 - Adding 2 or 3 years of clinical history provided almost no additional diagnostic leverage



High Risk Patients

- Given that 5% of patients are responsible for 50% of costs, can you predict high risk patients?
 - Answer: Not easily
 - Among patients with the highest 10 percent of costs at baseline:
 - 68 percent did not remain high cost in subsequent years
 - High mortality largely explained low persistence
 - High-costs were most persistent among people with a spinal cord injury (16 percent)



New Yorker, 2011

Is risk score fair for safety net providers?

- We examined V21 in the VA
 - CMS V21 identified 4 mental health and substance use HCCs'
 - CMS V21 model identified 694,706 as having a mental health or substance use condition.
- Of the 5,472,629 VA patients
 - Using another psychiatric comorbidities score, we identified another 1,266,938 patients with a mental health condition.
 - Depression NOS: 396,062 (31.3%)
 - Posttraumatic stress disorder: 345,338 (27.3%)
 - Anxiety: 129,808 (10.2%).
- Overall, the V21 model underestimated the cost of care by \$2,314 for every person with a mental health diagnosis.

Conceptual Issues are Re-emerging

Conceptual issues



Measurement issues



Photo Credit: Wildflower Schools

Conceptual Challenges

- What variables are missing from our risk adjustment algorithms?
- Should we control for those factors?
- All risk algorithm include age and sex. But what about homelessness, access to education or healthy food?

VA Purchased Care

- VA is purchasing more care, and the risk matters.

	VA		Community Care		
	N	Mean	N	Mean	P value
TKA					
Nosos score	6,293	3.04	7,357	1.50	<.001
Cataracts					
Nosos score	65,799	1.90	25,342	1.44	<.001

Is the playing field truly level?

- Selective contracting with providers who see vulnerable populations¹
- Equity, structural racism and social determinants of health²




1. Shepard M. Hospital Network Competition and Adverse Selection. National Bureau of Economic Research; 2016 Sep No.: w22600.

2. Nerenz DR, et al. Adjusting Quality Measures For Social Risk Factors Can Promote Equity In Health Care. Health Affairs. 2021 Apr 1;40(4):637-44

Social Determinants of Health

Should We
Include Social
Determinants?



Housing


- Considerable literature identifying homelessness and housing instability as a risk factor for poorer health
 - Mental health: suicide, depression, substance use
 - Health behaviors: cigarette smoking a chronic stress, depression,
 - Diagnosis: logistical challenges to may lead to delays
 - Treatment: Barriers to medication adherence, communication, and timely follow-up.

Competing Demands

- Measurable: can you measure the risk factor accurately and precisely?
 - Homelessness is hard to measure.
- Coding and “gaming”: does including the risk factor create perverse incentives that could result in gaming?
 - Including homelessness probably won’t lead to gaming.
- Financing:
 - We don’t want to finance housing through health care (too expensive).
 - A growing concern that value-based payments are creating “wrong pockets” problem

Fixing the Wrong Pockets Problem in Healthcare


HEALTH CARE	PURPOSE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deliver medical care services Maximize revenue; minimize PMPM costs for covered lives
	DATA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited or no social care data Claims data reflects what already happened
	FINANCING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 90% of health expenditures
PUBLIC HEALTH	GOVERNANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sector/system/entity specific Limited interoperability
	PURPOSE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve health of communities Reduce health disparities
	DATA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Siloed data
SOCIAL SERVICES	FINANCING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Allocation of taxpayer funds
	GOVERNANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government oversight Constituent opinion
	PURPOSE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deliver social care services
	DATA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal, unstructured Data describes aggregate process metrics
	FINANCING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Patchwork: Charitable, Grants, Government, other
	GOVERNANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Small, fragmented Limited scope



TRUSTED BROKER



PURPOSE	Better Health for Individuals in communities served
DATA	Integrated Medical, Social and Public Health Data
FINANCING	Contracting Rates Adjudication
GOVERNANCE	Multi-sector oversight



Recommendations

- More research— a number of recently funded grants and more under review
- Greater transparency— make it easy for readers to understand what we are controlling in data displays.
- Consider separate risk systems for performance measurement and payment.

Thanks

- Questions?
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